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Abstract
This thesis explores the motivation behind China’s policy on international
students. It seeks to explain why China forms a policy without clear
benefits for Chinese people. Using the concept of instrumentalist and
organizational realist approaches, the thesis is centered on political
competition and political pursuit to analyze the documents of China’s
international education policy. The main findings of this thesis expound
that the ruling class makes China’s policy on international students an
instrument of achieving political goal. The thesis indicates that the policy
is not in the best interest of the public and the public have not effectively
participated the process of policymaking. It argues that China expects that
some of the international students would become the leaderships of their
home countries and establish friendly relationships with China in the
future. The policy made by the central government suggests China’s
ambition to vie with western powers; whereas the policymakers from
provincial governments and universities attempt to pursue higher political
positions. The thesis shows that as the ruling class in China, the Chinese
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The number of international students in China has increased double
during the last two decades. According to the statistics from the Ministry
of Education 2010, international students in China numbered 256,000
(MOE, 2010b), while by the end of 2018 the amount of international
students is 492,185 (MOE, 2019). In fact, from the founding of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), China has experienced several phases
in international students. During the first phase, 1959–1979, very few
international students were admitted. During the second phase, 1979–
2000, the number of international students started rising. The third phase
represented a period of rapid growth. By 2000 the international student
body had increased 5 times (Ke, 2010). This is regarded by authorities as
great achievements. This kind of growth has tight connection with China’s
policy and its rise in economy.
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1.1 The incredible policy on international students
China developed a series of policies on international students in order to
attract international students, and the cost of these policies is considerable.
A 2014 news report announced that the government of Jiangsu province
had announced what seemed like surprising plan for international student
recruitment—Study in Jiangsu Action Plan (SJAP) (JSGOV, 2014), which
indicated that international students in Jiangsu province would receive
large numbers of scholarships (China Youth Daily, 2014). The amount
of money would be more than most Chinese people’s annual income.
Many Chinese expressed openly their discontent with the international
student policies on social media. Nevertheless Jiangsu is only one of the
31 provinces (municipalities/autonomous regions ) of China. After the
launch of Outline of China’s National Plan for Medium and Long-term
Education Reform (2010-2020) (OCNP) in 2010 (The State Council,
2010), all of the provincial governments, local governments, universities,
and other institutions in China began to make their own policies on
enrolling international students. These institutions have ambitious plans
to attract more international students before 2020.
A country generally brings in international students based on its
economic, demographic, and technological demands (Sá & Sabzalieva,
2018). Quite understandably, with the largest population and the second
largest economy in the world, China does not seem to need a large number
of international students in the short term. Given this circumstance, why
does China want to enroll international students in the short term? Why
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is the plan so important to China? And what is the motivation behind
China’s policy on international students? These topics are interesting and
deserving of study.
Answers to these questions are fundamental to understanding China’s
acts. Firstly, one of the important reasons for the growth of international
students in China will be pinpointed. Secondly, the research could con-
tribute to a proper understanding of the relations between the state and
globalization. Particularly, it would assist us in penetrating China’s attitude
toward globalization. Thirdly, we may gain a different perspective on
China’s motivation for its education policy. Lastly, this research could help
us apprehend the logic of power operating in China.
Due to its authoritarianism with a closed system, China has always
confused the outside world, and this makes it impossible to fully under-
stand how it operates. Though it claims to be a peace-loving socialist
country with Chinese characteristics, China has been arousing concerns
from all over the world because of the aggressive posture it adopts. By
answering the questions above, we may learn more about this distinctive
country.
1.2 The gap in policy analysis
In prior research, authors (Ascher, 1986; Begley et al., 2019; Boin, ‘t Hart,
& McConnell, 2009; Bovens & ‘t Hart, 1998, 2016; Dunlop, 2017; Mann
& Ingram, 1980; McConnell, 2016) concentrated on how to gain a better
policy on a public problem, but paid little attention to policies without
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virtual problem. That is to say, researchers and scholars are interested
in policies originated from a real public problem. Many authors had
examined China’s policies (K. Lieberthal & Lampton, 1992; K. Lieberthal
& Oksenberg, 1990). However, most previous research on this subject has
concentrated on China’s policies on politics, economy, culture, and higher
education itself (S. Guo & Guo, 2016; K. Lieberthal, 2004; B. G. Peters
& Zhao, 2017; Wen & Hayhoe, 2015; Wen, Luo, & Hu, 2014; R. Yang,
2014), whereas researchers have seldom focused on its motivation for
enrolling international students. Through this research, we can add some
knowledge to policy studies. It particularly contributes to the studies on
China.
1.3 The state as a tool
In this research, I argue that the ruling class in China used the state as a
tool to pursue their own interests. As ruling class, the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) controls most key resources in China, including the state
apparatus. The CCP members take most important positions in the
organizations of this country.
On the one hand, the CCP cadres in the central government work
for the legitimacy of the regime and their personal interests. Establishing
friendly relationships helps the CCP increase its impact on international
affairs and this also consolidates the CCP’s power in China. Also, the
central government tries to tell Chinese people that the CCP regime is the
best. The effort to make China great is one of their methods. The policies
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from the central government in Beijing fairly bristle with ambition to
become a superpower. An example of this ambition is China’s special
education policy to support students from so-called “One Belt, One Road”
countries (MOE, 2016). These strategies are useful to assist the CCP in
staying in power. Moreover, the cadres in the central government use the
state to pursue their family and bloc interest. By way of cooperation with
their international partners, many state-owned enterprises (Putterman &
Dong, 2000; Sheng & Zhao, 2013) operated by higher cadres’ families or
stakeholders benefit from these international cooperation.
On the other hand, local cadres trend to give priority to their own
power and interest. Although policymakers from Chinese provincial
governments and universities try to maximize their own interests and do
not target the China’s international strategy, they in reality are of service
to the central government by enrolling more international students. By
increasing international students, these policymakers attempt to meet the
requirements from the central government therefore improve their political
prospects. These cadres need to show their ability and achievements
to their superiors so that they may obtain higher positions, because
Chinese cadres are responsible for their higher cadres, not the people.
As a result, the international student policies from local governments or
education institutes do not take into consideration the public’s interests, but
policymakers own interests.
In short, the actors in the policymaking use the policy as an instru-
ment to pursue their own interests. The central government and other
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participants have different calculation, but their joint efforts yield a same
result—the increasing of international students. From this perspective, the
provincial and other institutional policies are based upon policymakers
interests, and they consist the national aim and policy in the meantime.
1.4 An overview of the methods
To add some knowledge to policy studies, I employed Marxist and post-
Marxist theories on the state to analyze China’s policy for international
student recruitment. In particular, instrumentalist and organizational realist
approaches (Block, 1981; Keeley, 1983; Miliband, 2009; Zucker, 1987)
have guided the research design. In addition to the research questions
and rationale, this thesis has examined how prior research connects to my
study.
This study is mainly based on document analysis. Major documents
are from the governments and universities in China. Also, second hand
materials are used to support my propositions. These materials includes
journal articles, organization reports, institute news release, and main-
stream media reports. I also used some internal mails and publicized
materials.
1.5 Definition of terms
Some key terms used in this study are defined as follows:
Policy is a fairly broad concept. In this study, policy means public
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policy. Public policy is made by elected or designated body and seeks to
achieve a desired objective that is deemed to be in the best interest of the
public.
China’s policy in this research includes policies made by provincial
governments, local governments, and other institutes. In this respect, all
the governments and institutes in China are keeping to a national plan on
education, and outwardly, these actors are pursuing a common aim—more
international student.
International students do not include students from Hong Kong,
Macau, and Taiwan, because China has special policy these regions. Also,
these students only pursue their higher education in China.
State capitalism in this study means the state intervenes in markets by
state-owned enterprises. That is to say, governments involve themselves
in business operation directly in order to accumulate capital (Milhaupt &
Zheng, 2014).
The Public in this research, this term can be interchangeable with
Chinese people.
Cadres in this research is interchangeable with officials, because most
key positions are taken by the Party cadres.
Totalitarianism in this study is regarded as a political mode that
officially prohibits opposition parties, and exercises high degree of control
over people and society, including control of ideology, weapons, the means
of communication, and system of terror. Additionally, a typical totalitarian
regime is usually led by a dictator. Its essential feature is that, as Conquest
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(2000, p. 74) describes, there are “no limits to its authority in any sphere,
and in practice extended that authority wherever remotely feasible”.
1.6 A road map to the thesis
Except introduction and conclusion sections, the thesis has 8 chapters. The
introduction shows the research questions, importance of study, and the
main arguments. The second Chapter is literature review which explores
the connection between my study and the prior research. The third chapter
shows main data sources and methods the thesis used. Chapter four, five,
six, and seven demonstrate the research findings. The eighth and nine




This chapter will show what relevant work has been done. Four themes of
research are analyzed, including policy analysis, China’s policymaking,
China’s policy on international students, and China’s engaging in global-
ization.
Policy studies is one of the most active parts of the social science
since 1950s (Dunlop, 2017; Kerr, 1976; Mann & Ingram, 1980; Mc-
Connell, 2010). Scholars and researchers from different disciplines have
contributed to the establishment of basic concepts, research methods, and
theories (Ascher, 1986; Shore, Wright, & Però, 2011). Their work lays
the foundation for policy studies as a field of knowledge (Allison, 2006).
However, there is not enough stress on policymaking in totalitarian states.
As a branch of policy studies, China’s educational policy has not received
much emphasis in comparison with other fields of study, and this partly
because China’s strategies on economy has gained more attraction. Most
of prior works on China’s education policies that I have reviewed tend to
explore the results and effects of certain education policies (Ding, 2008;
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Jiani, 2017; Song & Liu, 2014; Wen & Hu, 2018). There is a paucity
of research that explores the motivation of these policies deeply. In this
review, I evaluated four types of studies which have been done, including
policy analysis, China’s policymaking, China’s policy on international
students, and China and globalization.
2.1 Policy analysis
Policy studies is a well established and relatively mature field. Researchers
try to answer the following questions: (1) what is public policy; (2) how
is a public policy made; (3) what is the best policy, and (4) how is this
goal achieved. In short, the core of policy studies is to help us to solve
problems. Generally, policy studies can be roughly divided into two
categories—policymaking process and policy analysis. policymaking
process focuses on the question how a policy is made (J. E. Anderson,
2015; Birkland, 2010).
One key theme that scholars focus on is the elements that play key
roles in policymaking. Five theories are involved in prior studies. Elite
theory considers that elites have more influence in shaping public policy
than the general public (Dye, 2001; Schubert, Dye, & Zeigler, 2015).
Group theory argues that public policy is the product of a struggle among
different interest groups (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Cigler, Loomis,
& Nownes, 2015). Institutional theory emphasizes the formal aspects
of governmental structure, but has little emphasis on the willingness
of individuals’ participation (Stone, 2012). Unlike other theories on
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policymaking, rational choice theory borrows concepts and tools from
economics and tries to explain public policy with respect to the actions of
self-interested policy actors (Ostrom, 1998; Schneider & Ingram, 1997).
Political systems theory is a kind of general and comprehensive theory
which shows how the political system responds to demands from the
public and interest groups. This theory provides us with a way to think
about the relationships between policy actors and institutions (Kraft &
Furlong, 2017). These basic theories are useful to understand the factors
which influence public policy.
Another important theme researchers have discussed is the policy
process model (Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009; Sabatier & Weible,
2014). Policy process model, also known as the policy cycle model
(J. E. Anderson, 2015; Birkland, 2016; Jones, 1984), explores what kind
of activities affect the development of public policies. Agenda setting
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Cobb & Elder, 1983), policy formulation,
policy legitimation, policy implementation, policy and program evaluation,
and policy change are used to depict the flow of a policymaking (Jones,
1984; Kraft & Furlong, 2017). The policy process model shows six
important aspects of policymaking and can be very helpful to understand
how a public policy is produced. This model is regarded useful because
its concepts and language have considerable scope for different political
system and its policy processes.
Policy analysis is more heavily emphasized in policy studies. It
concentrates on the assessment of policy alternatives (Patton, Sawicki,
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& Clark, 2016). Policy analysis explores myriad significant topics and
research objectives, methodology, and evaluation are included (Goodin,
Moran, Rein, et al., 2008; Gupta, 2011; Schneider & Ingram, 1997).
The approaches to policy analysis are discussed by scholars (Bardach
& Patashnik, 2016; MacRae Jr & Whittington, 1997). Generally speak-
ing, steps in the policy analysis process include problem defining and
analyzing, policy alternatives constructing, evaluative criteria choos-
ing, alternatives assessing, and conclusions drawing. Policy analysis
designing that follows these steps has impacts on the policy process
(Bardach & Patashnik, 2016; Lindblom & Cohen, 1979; C. H. Weiss,
1978). Also, researchers have developed three types of policy analysis.
Scientific approaches are used to study policy for scientific purposes and
not to provide policymakers with answers to public problems (Millikan,
1959). Professional approaches are taken by many policy analysts from
government or private agencies to produce the best analysis possible.
Political approaches emphasize the advancement of values and goals by
their studies and findings. Except for the perspectives and approaches
mentioned above, there are some other types of policy research that are
available on journals or internet. New policy questions, ethics and value
questions for instance, are addressed (Bowman & Elliston, 1988; Weimer
& Vining, 2017).
In general, prior policy studies furnish us with tools to understand
policymaking process and policy analysis. These studies provide distinct
perspectives to view public policy. However, these studies emphasize little
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on three aspects. Firstly, the defined public problems in these studies are
real problems that the public concern. But in reality, some policies do
not start from real problems. In other words, policymakers may make
a policy to solve a problem which does not exist. Secondly, most of the
studies reviewed are conducted in democratic environment. These studies
have failed to considerate the situation that the public in totalitarian
states may be forbidden to participate policy process, though political
system theory deal with some topics in varied systematic environment.
If the governments and their affiliates have too much power to use public
resources, these models may not be applicable to this situation. Thirdly,
previous studies overlook an aspect that policies in different fields have
different influence on the state and society. In reality, more attention
is paid to financial policy than educational policy. Policymakers may
be more discreet to deal with those “important” fields. That is to say,
policymakers or even the public do not regard all policies seriously and the
quality of policy may be poor.
2.2 China’s policymaking
A fair amount of work has been carried out in the field of China’s policy-
making (Birkland, 2010; Heilmann, 2008; B. G. Peters & Zhao, 2017). On
the whole, these studies have placed much weight on China’s policies on
political and economic reform (Jakobson & Manuel, 2016; K. Lieberthal,
2004; K. Lieberthal & Lampton, 1992; K. Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1990),
while there is insufficient research to explain China’s motivation behind its
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policies. Yet some valuable work has been done.
Through a case study, B. G. Peters and Zhao (2017) show how
Chinese local government makes policy. Drawing on one of the authors’
5-month participant observation of the process of policy making in a
western province in China, the authors describe how Chinese citizens
participate in the policymaking process. They have managed to display
clearly the process of policymaking in China’s local governments. In
their conclusion, the authors mentioned that local cadres have their
own calculation in the policymaking. This conclusion is reasonable and
important, though they have not delved deeper. Taking account of the
policymaking situation in China, no matter how democratically the process
appears, it serves a fundamental aim—power. Local governments in
China always commit themselves to obtaining more power. Therefore,
this work did not touch the core part of China’s policy making which
focuses on bureaucrats’ career prospects, safety, and more interest.
Additionally, from the perspective of methodology, participant observation
in the governmental organization, as used by these authors, is somewhat
unreliable. Some colleagues including the head of the bureau where
one of the authors conducted his ethnography knew that the author was
conducting research, and the cadres may have disguised their real action or
motivation in order to project a certain image. The authors may have been
misled by the bureaucrats. Furthermore, considering the political climate,
Chinese authors usually practice self-censorship before they publish their
works so as not to get in trouble. Thus the credibility of the study, to some
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extent, can be challenged.
Unlike B. G. Peters and Zhao (2017), some scholars have devoted
their attention to China’s policy on foreign affairs. Lo and Pan (2016)
put China’s Confucius Institute (CI) project into a framework of tri-
partite taxonomies proposed by Nye (1990) and Tellis, Bially, Layne,
and McPherson (2001). Lo and Pan suggest that China’s intention is
to promote China’s image and exert influence on other countries by
its cultural diplomacy (“soft power”) via the CI project which aims to
promote Chinese language and culture, support local Chinese teaching
internationally, and facilitate cultural exchange (Hanban, 2020; Mattis,
2012). In this article, the authors contend that China has failed to create
appropriate, non-coercive and inter-cultural strategies to bring about
its intentional outcomes. In other words, the authors indicate that the
Confucius Institute Project has not achieved its aim. This article is a
useful attempt to explain the motivation behind China’s foreign policy.
As the authors mentioned, the Confucius Institute Project is in the name
of cultural promotion, but it has a potential aim of helping China gain
considerable advantage in the world system (Ford, 2015; D. L. Sham-
baugh, 2015). However, the authors neglect three aspects in their article.
Firstly, they fail to evaluate the outcomes by limited polls on the image
of China because they only interviewed 30 international students from
universities in Beijing. Secondly, the bona fide reasons for the launch of
Confucius Institute Project is not clear. Thirdly, the authors overlooked the
fact that while Chinese universities are major participants in Confucius
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Institute Project, these universities have their own calculation in the
cooperation with Hanban (Hanban, 2019) and foreign partners. In sum,
this article can not explain why the project has been operating, and it needs
more empirical evidence from Confucius Institutes and Hanban system
(Hubbert, 2019).
Resting on three cases of hydropower policy outcomes in China,
Heilmann (2008) makes contribution to the study of China’s policymaking
process. He holds that policy entrepreneurs have the ability to influence
the outcomes of hydropower strategy. The author situates his study in the
concept of “fragmented authoritarianism” developed by K. G. Lieberthal
and Oksenberg (1988). The author suggests that though the fragmented au-
thoritarianism framework applies to the policymaking process, the cadres
from government have involved more marginalized actors (peripheral
cadres, NGOs and activists ) in this process, which revealed a tendency
towards increasing pluralization. The author observed the shift of political
orientation of more participation in the policymaking process, which
is probably more significant than election and vote in villages in terms
of democratization. Again, although the author attempts to extend his
arguments to international trade, this research mainly focuses on domestic
affairs. The trend for pluralization would not change the fact that all the
processes must be subject to the ruling party’s interest, no matter how
many participants are involved in the process. The author also mentions
that the policy formation has integrated organizational and political goals
of various vertical agencies and regions, and outcomes of policy have
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been shaped by many participants. This argument is meaningful because
it shows a bargaining process among different participants. The concept
of “fragmented authoritarianism” is valuable to explain the power of local
governments or other participants in the process, partly at least, but all
the process has common internal logic of “party-state interest”. Also,
the central government and local governments have different pursuit of
interest. Pluralization does not necessarily mean that those participants
have power to make a final decision. A big hand behind this process is still
controlling the operation (Lampton, 2014, 2019; D. L. Shambaugh, 2008).
On the whole, prior research on policymaking in China retains three
features. At first, researchers tend to study agenda setting and process,
but have little to do with why a certain policy is needed. Further, what
they discuss concentrates on domestic affairs of China. Lastly, they fail to
separate national interest and organizational interest. The paucity of these
parts would provide a good start of my research.
2.3 China’s policy on international students
Apart from policy studies, a great deal of work has been done in the field
of higher education in China (Marginson, 2006, 2011; Mazzarol & Soutar,
2002; H. Wei, 2013). These studies may be classified into two types:
internationalization of higher education (King, 2014; R. Yang, 2014)
and domestic reforms (Wen & Hayhoe, 2015). These studies explore
the reasons why international students pursue their education in China
(Ferdjani, 2012; Jiani, 2017; Song & Liu, 2014; Wen & Hu, 2018). In
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addition, some authors put China’s higher education in the context of
global competition (Wen et al., 2014). But they seldom deal with the
matter why China made grand plans to enroll international students.
By making use of an updated “push-pull” model, Wen and Hu
(2018) endeavor to explain international students’ rationale to study in
China. Based on an interview with 30 international students in Beijing,
the authors found that the quality reputation of China’s higher education
was the major pulling force for international students to China, and
economy booming has made China an emerging regional hub for foreign
students. Their research evinces that students with different country and
culture origins have various trends and views on China’s higher education,
because they are pulled by varied factors. Students from developed
countries care less about economic factors, while students from developing
countries mind more about scholarship and jobs. The authors, in general,
found economic factors played most important role in driving international
students to China. They argue that China has become an important
educational destination due to China’s planned efforts and sustainable
investment into its higher education. Their research has also suggested that
there are very few international students in China because of attractions
of Chinese culture. This article has contributed to understanding the
international students’ rationales for choosing China as an important
destination for study. Many other studies emphasize economic motivation,
though they get involved in different methods (H. Wei, 2013; W. Zhang,
2010). But there are still three questions to answer. First of all, on a
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methodological level, the 30 interviewees are not an ideal sample because
there are more than 400,000 international students in China. Also, all the
interviewees are from Beijing, and it is not necessarily a reflection of the
features of the whole foreign students group in China. In addition, the
authors used a Chinese university ranking made by Shanghai Ranking
Consultancy (ARWU, 2019) which put Chinese universities in better
positions, while some rightful world-class institutions in Singapore, Hong
Kong, and Japan are lying lower position in the ranking. In other words,
China’s universities have not yet gained in worldwide popularity. Their
data, therefore, is not enough to support their arguments that international
students come to China because of the high quality of Chinese universities.
By studying the internationalization of higher education in China
during the past decades, R. Yang (2014) explores why China attempted to
pursue an internationalized higher education. He argues that engagement
with the international community could be an effective way to help
China enhance its status in the world. The author proposes that China’s
internationalization of higher education is part of a process of cultural
integration between China and Western countries. That is to say, China
has not yet created an authentic world-class higher educational system and
it is at a distance from developed countries in this respect. Furthermore,
the author explores the cultural factors that underpin the relations between
China and developed countries in higher education. He utilizes Chinese
traditional worldview—the concept of Tianxia (all-under-heaven) to
analyze China’s aspirations to return to the center of world stage. The
19
author tries to add a historical perspective to discuss the international-
ization of higher education. This article has shown how and why China
pursues an internationalized higher education by way of interpretation.
It addresses a cultural question about China’s efforts to internationalize
its higher education. The author’s arguments obtain support from other
studies (Gonondo, 2017; S. Guo & Guo, 2016; Ke, 2010; A. Li, 2018).
But the author has not provided any empirical evidence to support his
arguments. The question on how an abstract concept of Tianxia influences
the cooperation between China and Western countries is not answered
appropriately in the article. Additionally, the author fails to provide a
persuasive explanation as to why China pursues internationalization of
higher education even on the condition that universities in China are all
following western models from 1978 (Hayhoe, 1989, 2016).
In summary, prior scholarships on international students concentrate
on why foreign students choose to study in China, but researchers seldom
examine why China wants, without clear benefit, many international
students to study in China. Some of them mentioned that China has
ambition to show its soft power to the world (Cho & Jeong, 2008; Ding,
2008; W. Zhang, 2010). However, China’s soft power ambition is far from
being proved by scientific research. Hence improving China’s soft power
may not the reason for attracting international students. Accordingly, the
real causes still need to be explored.
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2.4 China and globalization
There are two trends in studies of China and globalization. The first is that
China is a source of globalization, even from very ancient Rome time.
The second proposition is that China has been absorbing civilization of
the western world. Generally, China’s globalization could be categorized
“inviting the world in” (yinjinlai) and “going out” (zouchuqu) (Hubbert,
2019, p. 5). To some extent, these studies partly reveal the facts of cultural
exchange. However, these studies have not explored that the globalization
is used as an instrument to grab interests and power by the dominant class
in China.
We have seen a plenty of research on the relations between the
state and globalization (Boyer & Drache, 1996; Haggard, 1995; Jotia,
2011; Rodrik, 2011; Rudra, 2002; Sassen, 2003). Many supporters of
postmodernism and globalization theories suggest that national state
would have no future, given the rise of other non-governmental actors
(Edwards & Usher, 1994). In other words, postmodernists and globalists
argues that nation-state may lose its control of many affairs which are in
charge of governments. With regard to China, scholars and researchers
have mainly explored three dimensions of China’s attitude towards
globalization. As for education policy, many studies show how China
embraced globalization (Berlie, 2020) and how globalization impacts on
China (S. Wei & Wu, 2001).
Two trends in the studies on the relations between globalization
and the state can be observed. Some scholars come to conclusions that
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there would be no nation state according to postmodernism to explain
the phenomenon, and the Westphalia system would collapse and the
boundary among nations would disappear (Bienefeld, 2010). Of course,
most studies on this topic are more balanced. They consider that the nation
state will not disappear in short time, and the globalization’s influence on
the nation are more and more serious (Robertson, 2007). I recognize these
trends and these arguments are supported by empirical data, given that the
multinational enterprises’ are widespread throughout the world (Burnham,
1997). With regard to China, however, its relation to globalization has not
been clearly explained.
Many scholars and researchers put emphasis on China’s attitude
towards globalization in economy and international trade (Branstetter &
Lardy, 2008; Kong, 2019). There are different definitions of globalization.
I prefer to borrow the concept of globalization: Internationalization,
liberalization, universalization or deterritorialization (Patil & Gopal, 2002,
p. 23). Previous studies suggest that socialism market economy strategy
and so-called Beijing Consensus (Yao, 2015) showed China’s open attitude
toward the globalization (Halper, 2010). However, Chinese governments at
different levels have never stopped intervening in the operation of Chinese
enterprises. And still, the state owned enterprises still control the economy
in China (O‘Connor, Deng, & Luo, 2006). Liang (2007) indicates that
China tends to choose those policies which can benefit Chinese national
interests.
Interestingly, scholars and researchers have noticed that China
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is managing the process of globalization, mainly, in economy (Dong,
Bowles, & Chang, 2010). Also, some scholars regard China uses the
globalization to increase its economy, but created a series of social
problems (C. K.-C. Chan, Ngai, & Chan, 2010). Some scholars emphasize
that China has undertaken pressure from globalization. However China
mainly follow its own logic, and this state capitalism proved resilient to
the 2008 financial crisis (Blecher, 2010). Some researcher points out that
China would develop a pro-liberation policy and embrace democracy
(Bienefeld, 2010), but China seems to have taken another road. Mathews
(2011; 2017; 2012) and his team regard that China helped other developing
countries experience a so-called “low-end globalization”. But China
itself is only a part of the chain of globalization. From the perspective of
China, it is still using the globalization to develop. As so, the government
can tolerate Chinese companies’ intellectual property theft which may
accelerate China’s economy growth. Some researchers suggest that the
income inequality in China has impeded China’s globalization (Xue, Luo,
& Li, 2014). Yang (2016) considers that China experienced the cultural
effects of globalization. Also, the author regards that China or Chinese
people has a feature of counterfeit culture. Even so the author has not
shown if the Chinese governments’ attitude to this so-called globalization
trend. Furthermore, the author considers that China counters global brands
by building the nation’s own brands. But it does not mean China counters
globalization. To some extent, this research has proved that that China is
an important country in the world and it is utilizing globalization.
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Plenty of research focuses on the globalization in China’s education
department (R. Yang, 2014). Because education is one of the most global-
ized department, which has been helping China increase its “soft power”
(Hubbert, 2019). As I mentioned above, some scholars consider that
China’s education international policy is not as good as western countries,
but China is trying to “regain” the center position of the world (R. Yang,
2014). This research shows the motivation of China’s education policy
(J. Li, 2018). However policy is always for some people, instead of an
abstract nation-state. Some one must benefit from certain policy, even in
the name of the nation.
Some scholars call China’s expansion is “socialist globalization”
(Berlie, 2020, p. 5). They attempt to differentiate China’s characteristic
from Western expansion hundreds years ago. Also, some scholars regard
that China’s globalization, in contrast to western countries, is more
comprehensive, including “political economy, finance, geopolitics, e-
commerce, and world trade” (Berlie, 2020, p. 208). Obviously, China’s
globalization is considered a new globalization. Still the essence of
China’s strategy has nothing different from other powers, considering
its feature of neo-colonialism (Dollar, 2016; Quinn & Heinrich, 2011).
From a perspective of Marxist theory, as representative of the dominant
and ruling class, the state of China is trying to control more key sources
worldwide, just as the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative (OBOR) made by
Mr. Xi Jinping regime.
Many studies on China’s globalization concentrate on how China
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learns from the world or how China exports its ideology. They have not,
however, given a satisfactory answer to the following question: why does
China want to do this? Because the facts prove that China as a state has not
gained what they want to have. Most of their international “investments”
can be seen as a kind of failure. The thesis tries to address this gap by




This research employed an instrumentalist approach to analyze the
motivation behind China’s policy on international students. Due to the
significant influence of structuralism on social science, structuralist
Marxism has largely displaced the instrumentalist Marxism approach
as one of the most important views of social studies (Jessop, 1985,
1990, 2002; Poulantzas & Martin, 2008). This shift happened in the
past years partially because class conflict was not emphasized after
the end of the Cold War. The structuralist Marxism stresses that the
institutions of the state must function to reproduce capitalist society as a
whole (Althusser, 1971). Whereas the instrumentalist Marxism suggests
that the state serves the ruling class directly and the state are under the
control of those members of the ruling class (Miliband, 2009). As the
only political party in power, the CCP controls all spheres in China.
However, capitalist economy is put into practice in China. Thus China
is not a typical socialist country or capitalist country. I consider that
instrumentalism is still applicable to the particular situation that it practises
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with a mixture of totalitarian politics and marked-based economy, so-
called Beijing Consensus (Ramo, 2004). According to instrumentalist
theory, the state functions to serve capitalist interests directly (Miliband,
1969, 2009). Although China calls itself a “socialist” country, it follows a
state-capitalism or “crony capitalism” (Pei, 2016) approach with special
“party-state” (dangguo) system which has basic features of capitalist
countries (Gu, Zhang, Vaz, & Mukwereza, 2016; L. Li, McMurray, Sy,
& Xue, 2018; D. L. Shambaugh, 2014). This theory is able to be utilized
effectively.
From a perspective of instrumentalism, the ruling class:
(1) owns and controls the means of production,
(2) it uses the state to dominate the rest of society, and
(3) state policies further in general the ruling class in maintaining their
domination of society (Barrow, 1993, p. 16).
The ruling class in China is a hybrid of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) members and the rich Chinese who are close to the party (A. Chan,
2003; Huang, 2008). The CCP and its partners, the ruling class in China,
almost occupy all key positions in the state apparatus and own the largest
proportion of wealth (Brzezinski, 2014; Davis & Wang, 2009; Ning &
You-Gui, 2007). The CCP uses the state machine to control the whole
country and makes all fundamental decisions to serve its own interests in
China (Edin, 2003; Pei, 2006). In this context, the instrumentalist approach
could furnish us with a framework for China’s motivation for international
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student enrollment so that we can understand those peculiar policies on
international students.
This research also uses an organizational realist approach to explain
the motivation of local governments and other institutions for enrolling
international students. Organizational realism suggests that state managers
focus on enhancing their own institutional power, prestige, and wealth
(Barrow, 1993, p. 125). In other words, state managers are always trying
to maximize their own interest (Skocpol, 1995). Therefore, states are both
decision-making organizations and autonomous organizational actors
(Block, 1981; Zucker, 1987). Local governments and other institutions in
China as organic parts of the state usually follow rules made by Beijing,
whereas they always try to optimize their own interests in their own
methods (Huang, 1996). The state organizational realism can be used to
explain the policy logic of local governments and institutions.
A state apparatus is composed of the governmental subsystem, the
administrative subsystem, the coercive subsystem, and the ideological
subsystem (Domhoff, 1978; Miliband, 2009). These subsystems in China
are functionally to keep the state operating, though China claims that its
system is different from the West (Dreyer, 2015; Heilmann, 2017). Using
the instrumentalist approach and organizational realist approach, I can
understand how the controllers in China’s state apparatus always endeavor
to enlarge their own interests. The Beijing central government’s policies
towards outside world would be used to strengthen the ruling class’s
domestic position in the name of national interest; while local governments
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and other institutions would try to highlight themselves and get more
opportunities to climb up on the ladder of power, and thus get access to
more key resources.
According to these propositions, I have observed that these orga-
nizations tend to pour their resources into fields which they themselves
may benefit from, but take no consideration into the interests of ordinary
people or society. Therefore, the motivation for some policies made by the
state could be measured by the activities of those involved institutions or
people. Specifically, there are three dimensions may be taken into account:
(1) Firstly, the beneficiaries of China’s international student policy.
Answers to the questions who benefit from China’s policy on interna-
tional students may show us their intentions behind the policy.
(2) Secondly, the willingness on the policymakers’ part to maximize the
interest of the public. That is to say, we must make it clear whether
Chinese policymakers give priority to Chinese people in the policy-
making.
(3) Thirdly, the degree of public participation. The public benefit from
a democratic policymaking process which helps to produce a better
policy (Kingdon, 2011; Mertha, 2009).
Utilizing the two approaches mentioned above, the contradiction





This chapter will describe the main methodology the research introduced
at first. From there it will describe what kind of data have been collected
and how to conduct analysis of these data.
4.1 Research tool
I mainly employed the method of document analysis in this research.
Several methods may, ideally, be used in the study, including interviews,
participant observation, and qualitative survey (Coffey, 2014; Tracy,
2013). However, given the situation that the research objective in this
study includes institutions and their documents in China, interview and
participant observation proved not to be easy. On the one hand, the polit-
ical climate does not allow the cadres or public servants who are informed
to disclose their internal procedure for policymaking. On the other hand,
China’s policymaking system is exclusive. That is to say, outsiders have
very small chances to know exactly how their important policies are made.
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Thus participant observation can not be conducted in the near future.
By comparison with interviews and participant observation, document
analysis is widely applicable for this type of research (Bowen, 2009).
Moreover, it is easy to get access to the documents which I have reviewed.
Currently, most of the important institutions, governments, and universities
in China have their websites and provide some information on their
projects. Consequently, document analysis has great advantages over
others in dealing with this research.
4.2 Data collection
Three sources of documents was considered to conduct the research. In
most cases, documents about international students issued by the central
government, provincial governments, and universities were included.
Specifically, the documents with political and competitive motivation
were examined. I collected 176 different documents from various levels
of institutes in China. Especially, I collected about 144 five-year plans
of Chinese universities. These documents indicated participants’ pursuit
of political interest, and showed their efforts to do better than other peer
institutes. In actuality, I analyzed more documents released by provincial
governments and universities in China.
Most of these documents are from provincial governments and
universities. The first document I need to analyze is the Outline of China’s
National Plan for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Devel-
opment 2010-2020 (OCNP) (The State Council, 2010). It was released by
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the central government of China, and this is the fundamental guideline of
China’s national education policy. The reason why I chose this document
is that it directly presents China’s political motivation for increasing
international students. At the same year, the Ministry of Education of
China (MOE) made a special supporting policy on international students
(MOE, 2010a). Other documents under review come from different
provinces, municipalities, and educational institutes. These documents
were used to interpret China’s motivation behind its efforts to recruit more
international students.
This research mainly involves policy documents from China issued
after 2000. The strategy was designed to make the research a feasible plan.
In this regard, three factors are taken into consideration. Above all, China
has been in a different policy environment in the post-Cold War era. China
claims it to be the largest socialist country and would take the place left by
the former-Soviet Union (Ong, 2013). The change of China’s position in
the world has been reshaping its policymaking. Moreover, the widespread
use of internet in China after 2000 (F. Shen, Wang, Guo, & Guo, 2009)
has made it easier to retrieve policy documents, and this makes it possible
for more researchers to conduct research on this topic without traditional
fieldwork. Lastly, it is only in last 20 years that international students have
been flocking to China (H. Hu, 2018; Ministry of Education, 2017).
The documents listed above are not all the materials I used in the
research. Some regulations on the management of international students
in China are included. I have retrieved these documents on official web-
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sites of ministry of education, provincial governments, and universities.
Although there are also hard copies of these documents, electronic edition
would enable other researchers to get easier access to them, so that
relevant research may be carried out.
4.3 Method of document analysis
I used two themes to analyze these documents: political interest (power)
and competition. According to Marxist theories about the state, political
interest can be transferred into power and more key sources in the state
system (Barrow, 1993; Isaac, 1987; Jessop, 1990). Consequently, the
observable evidence from subsystems of the state—the governmental,
the administrative, the coercive, and the ideological subsystem—can be
used to measure the motivation behind a policy. Similarly, competition
is to gain advantage in the structure of power which is one of the crucial
factors behind policymaking in China. Hence the two themes correspond
to subsystems of the state.
Specifically, I focus on three special parts of the documents I have
dealt with. The first part is the preface of a given document which helps
me get useful information about the meaning of the document. Then, I
pay much attention to the recall of their past work. This is a certain of
tricky part in the document. it indicates some weaknesses or deficiencies
in the institutes’ work achievements and their room to promote. It is very
useful to understand the institute’s motivation. The last part I stress is that
their goal or aim in the near future. This part shows directly what these
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institutes want to achieve.
Through analysis of these documents, a trend could be identified:
the various participants within the system of state are all in competition.
The central government in Beijing as a representative of China is vying
with other countries, especially western powers. Also, the provincial
governments are competing with their peer provinces (Hendrischke, 2013;
P. Li, 2002). Moreover, the universities are contending with their brother
institutes within and outside their provinces for a better position in the
rankings. However, the competition with western countries and domestic
vying have different forms.
Document analysis is major method in this research, but interviews
were conducted. I have interviewed some experts on policy and education
fields in China. I decided not to use the data collected from them. As the
interviewees said, their arguments or opinions have been clearly expressed
in their public publications. Probably, this is a kind of self-censorship. To
avoid ethical and political risks, this research used their public statements
and publications instead.
4.4 Trustworthiness of the study
This research is based on original documents and combined with expertise
in this field. It is a reliable and responsible study. Three methods may be
used to verify its validity.
Authentication verifying may be conducted. The materials used
in this research are from public publishes, so it is easy to verify their
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authentication. Most of the documents can be obtained from the internet.
Up to now, the five-year plans of the universities supported by the Ministry
of Education are still downloadable on its official website. I have also
kept copies on my local hard drives. Some important documents, the
OCNP for example, was translated into English by some experts, and these
documents were kept by individuals or institutes. Researchers can have
access to these materials to conduct further studies.
Also, the study has included reference to prior research. This research
has not started from scratch. It followed prior research on policy in China,
as mentioned in the literature reviews. Some reasonable explanation in
this research can be supported from other scholars. For example, there are
different opinions about the nature of the CCP, and my research takes those
testified and reliable arguments. Again, these public published studies by
other experts are not difficult to retrieve over the internet.
Last, thanks to the current time of mass media, people can get
more useful experience evidence from social media. I obtained a large
number of information from social media about the policy on international
students. To some extent, the complaints about public policy on Wechat
(Weixin, FaceBook and WhatsApp’s competitive service) and Sina Weibo
are very helpful to understand China’s policies and their social reaction.
I collected some documents on education in Jiangsu Province through
social media and they are useful. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to verify
these claims. Sometimes, the social media in China provides useful clues
to explore further.
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Generally, the data collected for this research is verifiable, and the
methods used are practical and to some extent repeatable. Therefore I can
write up reasonable findings in the following chapters.
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Chapter 5
Public policy not for the public
One of the findings in this research is that China’s international student
recruiting policy is of low relevance to the interests of most Chinese
people. In other words, Chinese people do not benefit from this policy.
First, no evidence indicates that China needs more international students.
Second, there is no real description of the reasons for the policymaking
except some blurred expression. That is to say, this policy on international
students is not a typical public policy which is considered to be in the best
interest of the public .
5.1 No shortage of international students
China’s shortage of international students, if it is true, is not mentioned
in the documents I have reviewed. The research shows the reasons why
Chinese governments need to introduce the current international student
enrollment policy, and three reasons can be identified:
(1) according to some guiding principles of a certain meeting held by the
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CCP;
(2) following some leaders’ intention;
(3) to improve internationalization or China’s education standard....
The CCP’s National Conferences are, nominally, one of the major
origins of some policies. Usually, the CCP’s national conferences give
guiding principles (jingshen) to the development of the country. Also,
the Plenary Sessions of the Central Committee of the CCP is another
significant origin of policies. For example, Mr. Deng Xiaoping launched
the “reform and opening up” policy at The 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1978.
Rather than respond to people’s requests directly, like presidents in
democratic countries, Chinese leaders prefer to formulate policies top-
down. Most of the policies are carried out even without public support.
Under certain circumstances, the CCP’s policymakers do not ask the public
for advice even if their policy is good to people, especially during the last
two decades. This may partially explain why I have not found any logical
explanation of the reason for the policymaking in the documents.
First of all, the central government’s policy, the OCNP, describes the
reason for the policymaking in its preamble:
The Party and the State have all along put a premium on edu-
cation. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China,
the entire Party and society, working hard under the leadership
of Party’s three generations of central collective leadership
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with Comrades Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin
at the core, and the Party’s Central Committee with Comrade
Hu Jintao as General Secretary, have blazed a road to develop
socialist education with Chinese characteristics, established
the world’s largest education system, and guaranteed the
right to education for billions of Chinese. · · · In the face of
unprecedented opportunities and challenges, we must stay
levelheaded about the fact that education in this nation is still
lagging behind the requirements of national socioeconomic
development and people’s demand for fine education. (The State
Council, 2010)
It shows only leaderships care about China’s education, and China
must improve its education standard. If it is true that “our concept of
education and our teaching contents and methodology are relatively
outdated” (The State Council, 2010), enrollment of more international
students apparently is not an ideal solution. The document does not shown
why China should recruit more international students. However, these
ideas are not from Chinese people without a doubt. In China, the CCP
claims that it represents the people, but there is no mechanism to make it
represent people under the undemocratic environment.
Also, there is no convincing reasons for increasing international
students in the documents from provincial governments. Shanghai Munici-
pality’s policy document, for instance, indicates that:
To improve the quality and standard of Shanghai higher ed-
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ucation, to build better socialist universities with Chinese
characteristics, and to speed up to realize the modernization of
higher education, · · ·, we made this policy. (SMEC, 2017)
Of course, this document also says it follows the “spirit” (jingshen,
guiding principle) of the OCNP guideline for education from the central
government. In the same document, we can read between the lines that
Shanghai needs to increase the number of international students but there
is no explanation why Shanghai needs to do this, needless to say if it is
necessary for the public. Documents from other provinces are similar
to Shanghai’s wording. Generally, the public in China do not need more
international students in China. At least, Chinese people are not beset by
the “shortage” of international students.
The third, there is no justification for the recruitment of international
students in the universities’ five-year plans. Some documents contain the
reasons but they are unconvincing because those reasons are not based on
facts. For example, a Chinese university supervised by Zhejiang provincial
government claimed that it needed more international students. Therefore
the university launched an aggressive plan to recruit international students
(ZJNU, 2016), but its basic function is to train teachers for primary
schools. This university plainly does not have enough education resources
to support its international education. The university, however, still tried
to enroll more international students, which is clearly showed in its five-
year plan. All the universities supervised by the Ministry of Education of
China (MOE) made five-year plans and demonstrated their ambition to
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enroll more international students (MOE, 2015, 2017b).
Evidently, China’s policy on international students is not a typical
public policy which aims for the interest of the public. No evidence
indicates that China is short of international students. Moreover, the
policymakers have not given a logical explanation of the reasons. This
policy can bring about a problem that other departments of universities
may lose some resources which belong to them because of this policy.
Therefore shortage of international students is not a real problem.
Contrary to the claim in the official documents, ordinary Chinese
people indeed worry about too many international students in China, which
may occupy Chinese own citizen’s education resources (Zhou, 2019).
China’s policy on international students seems to have originated from
some reasons, but making the policy for interest of the public is not among
them. Actually, the governments never tell the public why they made this
policy except some slogan-like sentences in the document.
5.2 The CCP cadres’ concern
The foregoing section reveals that the public has no cause for concern
about the shortage of international students. Nevertheless, there must be
some reasons for the policymaking. Some vague clues have been found in
the official documents.
What the central government cares about is China’s international
position or impact. In the OCNP, China expresses clearly that its education
policy aims to “enhance the nation’s global position, influence and
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competitiveness in the field of education” (The State Council, 2010). As
for the specific policy, the essential arrangement is that “more international
students shall be admitted for studies in this country” (The State Council,
2010). Though the document from the central government sets the back-
ground of its policy as “the changing international and national situation”,
it does not define what is the “situation”. Similarly, the document does not
explain why the “situation” needs to increase the amount of international
students. Without a doubt, much more money from Chinese taxpayers is
needed to carry out the policy. Again, the public can not be happy to get
more international students to spend their own money.
As the most important guideline about international students from the
central government, “Study in China Plan” (SCP) made by the Ministry
of Education releases details on China’s official concerns. The policy
document has clarified why the government made the plan: “The plan
aims to strengthen exchange and cooperation in education, to help more
international students to study in China, and to improve the standard of
internationalization” (MOE, 2010a). Also, at the very beginning of the
document, it says that the policy is to carry out the national plan. The
document makes no effort to explain the connection between this policy
and the needs or interests of Chinese people just as I discussed about the
policymaking above.
Provincial governments in China take more notice of Beijing’s
opinion, rather than the public’s attitude in the process of policymaking.
In the documents from provincial governments, I have not found the
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expression of ideas from the public. Anhui province suggests that the
policy on international students is the implementation of “Study in China
Plan” and a promotion of Anhui’s international education (APDE, 2013).
The policies on international students in other provinces and municipalities
(Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing) are similar to that of Anhui
province.
There are two features of stylized narratives in the policies made by
provincial governments. To begin with those policies are under direction
of the central government, or the fulfilment of national plan. This means
that China’s local governments try to show their respect for the central
government in Beijing. The next feature is that these provincial policies
emphasize the characteristics of their own jurisdictions. In other words,
different provinces have their own calculation based their own realities
or inclinations of top cadres. The documents I have reviewed include
some high frequency words like “the Party and the state”, “the Party and
government”, “emphasize”, “we need”, “not good enough”, “compare
with”, and “require” etc. . . .. However, one can not find and trace any
bases for their claims. Particularly, none of these polices show that the
policymakers have taken into consideration of the public’s opinions.
Jiangsu province’s response to the question from the public was removing
posts and forbidding discussion.
Universities’ policies on international students do not show their
relation to the public. Within China’s framework of governance, not
only do provincial governments stay away from the public, but also
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the universities do. It is difficult to find real problem statements in the
documents from Chinese universities. Needless to say, causes descriptions
are reduced to empty and conventional phrases. For example, Southwest
Jiaotong University describes its problem as “existence wide gap between
our university and other peers” (SJU, 2016, p. 9). But gaps always exist.
Typically, three types of reason statements can be found in these plans for
the development of university:
(1) The requirements of causes of the Party and the state;
(2) the demands for the development; and
(3) the need for additional reforms and openness.
The first reason statement means that the causes (shiye, aims) of the
CCP and the state require a university to make certain policy. However,
there is no definition of these causes. The word “cause” here is not a
real aim or goal written on paper, but a kind of abstract and undefinable
“revolutionary cause”. In short, this is not a real reason. The second
statement shows that the “development” requires a university to frame
certain policy. Here “development” is close to progress. Again, I have
not found clear definition of the development in the documents. With
regard to “reform and openness”, this sort of clichÃ© has nothing to do
with their policies. In practice, the three statements above are nothing
but hand waving or cant. Some universities even formulate statements
which can not be verified. Jilin University addresses its problem that its
achievements have not met the expectations of the Party, the state, and
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people (JLU, 2016, p. 6). One can not prove that the public or the state
indeed has shown the aspiration. Apparently, the public’s concern is not
embodied in the documents, but the cadres’ opinions are expressed.
In general, it is difficult to trace the origin of a problem that China’s
policy on international student enrollment intends to resolve. No evidence
shows that China suffers from shortage of international students. In other
words, the public do not benefit from China’s policy on international
students. On the contrary, some proofs indicate that there are too many
foreign students for Chinese people (Zhou, 2019).
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Chapter 6
Policy without effective participation of
the public
Based on the analysis of the documents, I found that the public are kept
apart from the policymaking process. Also, the public have no approaches
to the policymaking, even if some people want to get more information
about the policy. Furthermore, outsiders are difficult to have access to the
policymaking due to its absence of openness and transparency.
6.1 The public has little influence on the policy process
People’s voice is difficult to be heard or expressed in the policymaking.
Basically, the public are not involved in the process of policymaking.
According to some research, the public do not have opportunities to
participate policymaking (K. Lieberthal & Lampton, 1992; B. G. Peters
& Zhao, 2017). Apparently, the governments in China are willing to hold a
monopoly on the policymaking.
At the level of central government, the national plan of education
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is devised according to the CCP’s purpose. The first sentence of the
policymaking is “in terms of the 17th National Congress of the CCP on
‘giving priority to education and building a country with strong human
resources’” (The State Council, 2010). The Chapter 16 of this document,
“Further Opening China’s Education” deals with international education.
Specifically, only two sentences in the Chinese edition of the document
focus on international student enrollment:
More international students shall be admitted for studies in this
country. Chinese government scholarships shall be increased,
with financial assistance offered mainly to students from other
developing countries, and the composition of students coming to
this country for studies shall be optimized (The State Council,
2010, p. 35).
The “Study in China Plan” made by Ministry of Education is based
on this document. However, the narrative is too simple and arbitrary.
Similarly, I have not found any information on whether the public had
participated the policy making. Common sense suggests that the delegates
in the National People’s Congress (NPC) are not elected by Chinese
people and do not represent Chinese people (O‘brien, 2008). Granted
that people’s delegates indeed speak on behalf of Chinese people, I have
not discovered any meaningful proposals concerning the enrollment of
international students formulated by the delegates. Apparently, at the
central government level, Chinese people do not have an effective way to
participate the policymaking.
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At the level of provincial government, it is a formidable challenge
to fathom how a policy works out. However, some basic procedure
for the policymaking can be found. Mainly, provincial governments’
policies are based on guidelines or orders from Beijing central government
and provincial governments’ competition for key sources. That is to
say, provincial governments make their policies according to Beijing’s
requirements on the one hand, and they calculate and maximize their own
interests via policymaking on the other.
Jiangxi province, for example, developed its policy on education
which includes guidelines for international students enrollment. At the
beginning of the document, it says “this policy is made according to the
spirit (jingshen, guiding principle) of the policymaking (the OCNP),
and the actuality of Jiangxi province” (JXPDE, 2012). There is only one
sentence to prescribe Jiangxi’s action on international students: to speed up
internationalization of education, and keep more than 10,000 international
students studying in Jiangxi province (JXPDE, 2012). Jiangxi province’s
policy almost copied the title of the central government’s document.
Other provinces even local province follow the same logic. Hubei
province has similar policy called Outline of Hubei’s Provincial Plan
for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development (2011–
2020). It indicates in its introduction that the policy is based on the
national outline and Hubei’s actualities. Its basic task is to improve the
development of education, to build stronger province with better education
and human resources, and to make Hubei the most important province in
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the rise of central part of China (HBPDE, 2011). These assertions from
cadres about education show no participation by the public in the process
of policymaking.
The absence of the public’s participation is not merely limited
in governments, but it is also at the university level. To large extent,
teachers and students should have taken part in the policymaking because
they are closer to the decision makers. However, teachers and students
are not involved in the policymaking process. In its introduction to
international students, the policy of Guizhou University indicates that
the program aims to improve the internationalization and to promote
development of the international education of the university (CIEGU,
2019). The description of goal is similar to that of the central government
and provincial governments. This type of narrative is not uniquely in
Guizhou University’s document. Fudan University shows in its 13th
five-year plan that the plan is designed to carry out the Party’s “strategic
decision” on the “Double First Class University Plan” (DFCUP) launched
by the central government (Office of Planning, 2016; M. A. Peters &
Besley, 2018). As a matter of course, the public have no roles to play in
the policymaking.
Normally speaking, the policymakers at universities in China may
seek advice from faculty or professionals. Thus they may gain some
information about a policy. But the public have little chance to know how
the process goes through. The public is the last to get to know the policy.
Of course, the policymakers at university some times release a final draft
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to ask the public for advice. According to China’s regulation (The State
Council, 2008), they may post a phone number and/or an email address
on the internet to get feedback from the public. But they rarely respond
to questions so that the public can not follow up easily (Enserink &
Koppenjan, 2007; K. Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1990). For example, Zhen
University (pseudonym) publishes new policies on its official website,
and asks the public for comments. However, the public do not know how
the policymakers handle people’s comments or advice. Furthermore,
ordinary people do not show consideration for people “beyond” their own
lives. Policy on international students is nothing special to the public.
Consequently, the public lose the opportunities to participate public
policymaking.
Overall, the policymaking starts from the above and ends at the
above. Regardless of the central government, provincial governments, or
universities, the policies on international students are neither introduced
nor formulated by the public. The central government’s policy is a result of
a certain “leader”; a province’s policy is a kind of response to the national
plan, and universities comply with the requirements from governments.
There is no direct evidence to show people’s effective participation in the
process. Also, no firm support for the view indicates that the policymakers
in this system care about the public. Thus the public in China have little
influence on policymaking.
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6.2 Lack of transparency in the policymaking
Outsiders have little knowledge of how the policies on international
students are formulated. The policy document from the central government
does not introduce the public to the process of the policymaking. The
provincial governments and universities also conceal the basic information
regarding the procedure or steps of the policies.
The central government does not properly explain its policy in the
document. The “Study in China Plan” (SCP) only stipulates what the
country should do without details except that the amount of international
students China should have by 2020. That is to say, this document is
full of general and vague description of prospects, only the number of
international students may become reality. For example, this document
shows that the aim of China’s international education is to make China the
largest destination for international students by 2020 and nurture a large
number of international students who understand China, befriend China,
love China, and espouse China (zhihua, youhua, aihua,qinhua) (MOE,
2010a). Also, its work plan includes one sentence: to increase the scale,
to optimize the structure, to standardize the management, and to enhance
the quality of international students (MOE, 2010a). However, it is not clear
who framed this policy. The process of policymaking seems to be kept in a
black box so that the public have no way to trace.
Much the same as the central government, policies on international
students from provincial governments are lack of transparency. Provincial
governments operate the same mechanism as the central government.
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Chinese provincial governments have similar structures and methods for
policymaking to that of the central government. A Chongqing Munici-
pality’s policy on international students shows that its policy is based on
the spirit (jingshen, guiding principle) of the 18th National Congress of
the CCP (including the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Plenary Sessions), the State
Council, and Ministry of Education (CMPG, 2017). This document seems
to have mentioned most of the relevant “guidelines” from the Beijing
central government. However, it does not shed light on how the policy was
planned and executed. For the most part, the public pay no attention at all.
Some people might wish to receive information about the policy, but the
governments do not make it available.
Under the direct leadership of the CCP, the lack of transparency
in the universities’ policymaking has much in common with Chinese
governments. It is normal that the faculty of a Chinese university know
nothing about their policy on international students. From my own
experience at university, I had little knowledge of international education
policy, though I had worked there for years. Lanzhou University had
planned to recruit 1000 international students in its 13th five-year plan
(LZU, 2016, p. 57). However, faculty and staff do not know why they need
1000 international students. Moreover, the university planned to improve
facilities and amenities for international students, though its policy had
repeatedly come under strong criticism on the internet. Also, other than
its generous allowance or scholarships, the university tries to develop
English courses (LZU, 2016, p. 42) to attract more international students.
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Considering that most Chinese families are not rich, the public would not
like to see taxpayers’ money on international students if they know well
about the policy. Unfortunately, the public manifestly are kept out of the
policymaking.
In short, the public in China have not really participated in the public
policy. In practice, ordinary Chinese people are kept out of the whole
process. The public’s will have not been expressed in the policy let alone
exert influence on the policy.
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Chapter 7
Political motivation in the policy
Several factors have played key roles in the policymaking decisions on
international students. First, the leaderships at all levels of institute in
China tend to dominate all crucial processes of policymaking. Second,
political prospects are primary consideration for cadres in variety of
institutes, and cadres are not willing to take any political risks to make any
policy. Third, political demands decide the goals and tasks of a policy.
7.1 The leadership is a key factor in policymaking
The CCP’s leaders dominate important policymaking in China. In Chinese
political context, the term “leader” is not only used to call the top cadres in
the central government in Beijing, but also used by all the cadres to call
their superiors. The leaders on different levels are accountable to their
superiors (Brødsgaard, 2012), so the leaders’ propositions perform crucial
roles in policymaking. Also, Chinese incumbents need endorsements from
some “great leaders”. Consequently, this kind of information can be read
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directly in the documents I have examined:
. . . working hard under the leadership of the Party’s three
generations of central collective leadership with Comrades Mao
Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin at the core, and the
Party’s Central Committee with Comrade Hu Jintao as General
Secretary, have blazed a road to develop socialist education with
Chinese characteristics, · · · (The State Council, 2010)
The leaders’ name mentioned in the document is politically moti-
vated. Chairman Mao and Mr. Deng Xiaoping are considered as “great
leaders” in China because Chairman Mao is the founder of the People’s
Republic of China (Cheek & Blight, 2002), and Mr. Deng Xiaoping earned
him the reputation as the “Architect of Modern China” by leading China
to a market-based economy reforms (Vogel, 2011). These names represent
certain legitimacy in China, which means the policy is unchallengeable.
As for Mr. Jiang zemin and Hu Jintao (Brown, 2012; Gilley, 1998), they
were incumbents when the OCNP was made. Such names give a true
reflection of the leaders’ place in the CCP’s history. Therefore some
leaders are in the document, but some are not. This is about politics rather
than policy.
Unlike policies from the central government, provincial governments
and universities rarely mention any leaders’ name in their policies. Also,
no provincial top cadres’ names are mentioned in the documents. For
instance, Henan province’s 13th five-year plan for education emphasizes
that it is under the leadership of the CCP provincial committee and
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provincial government to work out the policy (HPDE, 2017). All the
documents from provincial governments I have reviewed do not show any
cadre’s name.
That no top cadres’ names are shown in provincial policy doc-
uments does not mean “leaders” at provincial level are unimportant.
In truth, the CCP provincial committee secretaries have tremendous
power in policymaking in their own jurisdictions. As the most important
cadre in the Party/government at the level of province, a provincial
party committee secretary has dominant influence on policymaking. All
provincial governors are deputy party committee secretaries. These top
leaders in a province have power to approve and veto any policy in their
own provinces. Commonly, they are in name of certain CCP’s national
congress, leaders, higher tier governments, or the CCP organization to
make their policy, but they consider more of their own interests. For
example, the party committee secretary is able to hire or fire most cadres
(his/her subordinates) in the government without normal procedures. The
top cadres’ ability to shape any policies in China is unbelievable.
The process of policymaking at university is dominated by the
party committee secretary who is the most powerful official at university.
A president of Chinese university usually is deputy party committee
secretary. Consequently, the party committee secretary at university has
power to decide hire or fire a professor, let alone making of policy on
international students (Jungblut, 2015). The CCP at Chinese university
plays a very powerful role, and its committee secretary is not only a power
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representative, but a decision maker, administrator, and coordinator (Jiang
& Li, 2016). The Party committee secretary at Zhen University even
directly take part in the making of policy on international students. What
this party committee secretary considers is how many more international
students he can get, instead of the education quality or students’ standard.
In short, the party committee secretaries need fascinating statistics as po-
litical achievements to show their superiors. Finally, the party committee
secretary of Zhen University succeeded to get a higher position in the
capital city. And then, this person may qualify for free summer retreat
at the Beidaihe resort (summer camp for high-level cadres) every year
(Gilley, 2004), which is a symbol of status in the official circle.
In general, the CCP cadres dominate all policies in China. The Cen-
tral government’s policies follow the spirit (jingshen, guiding principle)of
“leaders”. Provincial top cadres perform decisive role in the process of
policymaking, though their names may not show in the policy documents.
In addition, universities in China are miniatures of Chinese governments.
They use the same logic in dealing with policymaking. Consequently, the
leadership in a totalitarian regime like China hold a virtual monopoly in
policymaking.
7.2 Politically correct rules are applicable
Political correctness is apparently expressed in many documents I have
studied. There are two aspects to show. First, the ideology of CCP must be
displayed in certain form. Second, there are no essentially negative aspects
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have been shown in the documents.
The policy on international students from the central government
must highlight ideology and political base. A document from the Ministry
of Education about the quality of international education indicates why
that policy was made:
To seriously carry out the spirit (jingshen, guiding principle)
of the 19th National Congress of the CCP, to promote the
connotative development of higher education, the ministry made
the standards . . . (MOE, 2018).
The above quote clearly articulates that the Party is source of the
policy. The OCNP states that the 17th National Congress of the CCP
required to “give priority to education and turn China into a country
rich in human resources” (The State Council, 2010). That is to say, all
these requirements are from the CCP, and should be followed and carried
out without condition. Moreover, in the same document, there are some
sentences which seems to be utter futility of propaganda, but in actuality
very important for the cadres who led the policymaking:
Upholding the great banner of socialism with Chinese char-
acteristics, taking Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important
thought of Three Represents as the guideline, implementing
the Scientific Outlook on Development in depth, carrying out
the strategy of rejuvenating the nation through science and
education and the strategy of making the nation strong by
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relying on talents or professionals, giving priority to education
development, improving a socialist modern education system
with Chinese features, running education to the satisfaction of
the people, and building our nation into a country rich in human
resources. (The State Council, 2010)
Though these words have no concern with the national guideline for
education itself, the document places great emphasis on socialism and
the CCP leaders’ thoughts. Former General Secretary of the CCP Jiang
Zemin (1989–2002 in office) propounded “Thought of Three Represents”
which reiterates the CCP’s autocracy (Backer, 2006; China Daily, 2007).
Also, Mr. Hu Jintao had his political philosophy “Scientific Outlook on
Development” (Xinhua, 2012), and the current chairman of China Mr. Xi
Jinping has developed his own ideology—“Xi Jinping Thought” or “Xi
Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New
Era” (Buckley, 2017, 2018; Xinhua, 2018). The ideological messages
must be embodied in all documents otherwise the policymakers have
poor prospects for their career. In extreme case, these policymakers may
be put in jail because of political strife. To protect themselves, as a rule
policymakers adopt self-censorship. Therefore any policymakers in China
must take great care to ensure political correctness and avoid political “red
line”. As a result, political correctness has become a standard practice in
policymaking.
The policies on international students from provincial governments
strongly emphasize ideology. Jinlin province’s policy on education
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points out that the 13th five-year plan is crucial to completely invigorate
the economy and “comprehensively build a moderately prosperous
society”(xiaokang shehui). This situation imposes new and further require-
ments on the development and reforms of education (JPDE, 2017, p. 2). In
reality, “moderately prosperous society” is only a political slogan made by
the CCP, and it has no bearing on education development. However, the
policymaker in Jilin province put these sentences at the very beginning
of the document. In other words, this suggests that policymakers try to
declare their allegiance to the Party and its top leader in Beijing. Instead
of attempting to make an effective policy, the policymakers lay more
stress on their own pursuit of interests. In the documents from provincial
governments I have reviewed, all the policymakers claim that they follow
the sprits (jingshen, guiding principle) of the central government or certain
leader(s) of the CCP.
At the university level, the policies on international students not only
follow the requirements from the central government, but also comply with
provincial orders. Hunan University is publicly funded by the Ministry
of Education, and the university logically is supervised by the central
government. Therefore its policy on education says that it must “highly
uphold the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and
comprehensively carry out the Party’s education policy” (HNU, 2016,
p. 10). At the same time, this university document shows it responds to the
pleadingly expectations from Hunan provincial committee of the CCP and
Hunan Province People’s Government. Except some professional aims, a
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large part of these documents manifest their makers’ political awareness
and calculation.
In general, policies on international students made by Chinese gov-
ernments and universities are politically correct. The CCP’s policymakers
try to avoid political risk, even if the policies never amount to anything.
Highlighting the CCP’s leadership, showing respects to incumbent top
leader or influential former leaders, as a kind of political correctness
weighs heavily in the documents I have analyzed.
7.3 Policy is a container for propaganda
The CCP puts considerable emphasis on publicity. All over the important
institutions in China are being gradually penetrated by tentacles of the
Publicity Departments of the CCP (D. Shambaugh, 2007). The govern-
ments and their affiliated institutes have their divisions of publicity. In
the light of the CCP’s ruling status, its Publicity Department of Central
Committee (CCPPD) leads the propaganda about socialism, the Party’s
leadership, and other ideological work, including media (press) censorship.
At the level of provincial government, the Publicity Departments of the
CCP are in charge of ideological-relevant work in the corresponding
province. Aside from ideology propaganda, the CCP’s publicity de-
partments involve getting publicity for variety of “great” things in their
jurisdictions.
Policies from the central government indicate that the CCP is the
“greatest” ruling party. In the policymaking, the policymaker boasts:
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(The CCP) established the world’s largest education system,
and guaranteed the right to education for billions of Chinese.
Education funding is growing by large margins, while school-
running conditions have improved dramatically. . . . Remarkable
progress has also been made in achieving education equity.
Improvements in education has vastly enhanced the quality
of the entire nation, . . . thereby making irreplaceable and
significant contributions to China’s economic growth, social
progress, and the betterment of people’s livelihood. (The State
Council, 2010, p. 5)
The document shows that the policymaker attempted to display the
CCP’s worthy record of achievements, though all these things are entirely
irrelevant to the policy. The policy is regarded as a propaganda tool to help
the CCP consolidate its power. Thus political motivation is incorporated
into the policy.
Tremendous compliments have not only been given in the policies
from the central government, but integrated into policies from provincial
governments. The Outline of Guangdong Provincial Plan of Education
points out:
Upholding the great banner of socialism with Chinese char-
acteristics, taking Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important
thought of Three Represents as the guideline, implementing
the Scientific Outlook on Development in depth,carrying out
the strategy of rejuvenating the province (Guangdong) through
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science and education and the strategy of making the province
strong by relying on talents or professionals, . . . (GDPDE, 2010,
section 1, chapter 1)
These words are ideological propaganda of the CCP, and all the poli-
cies on education just repeat the sentences except this document used the
province to replace the nation in the OCNP. This expression in the policy
is nothing more than political allegiance to the Party Center (the CCP’s
central committee, called dangzhongyang in Chinese) because it does
not have any relevance to the development of education in Guangdong
province.
In the same document, the provincial policymaker repeats the words
used in the policy of the central government to describe Guangdong’s
“great” achievements. It declares that “ the provincial committee of the
CCP and the provincial government ascribe great importance to education”
(GDPDE, 2010). Again, it almost a copy of the central government’s
policy with the exception of the replacement of nation by province.
One of the common characteristics of these policies on education is
that the policymakers boast about what they have achieved. Guangdong
province’s policy recalls that how the province built the largest education
system in China, and how it contributed to the development of science,
culture, economy, society, and people’s lives (GDPDE, 2010). Guangdong
is not the only province who cares about their achievements. As an
underdeveloped region in China, Gansu province is obviously boastful
about its “extraordinary” accomplishments. Gansu’s Outline of Provincial
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Plan of Education describes its educational success as:
Under the leadership of the CCP’s provincial committee and
provincial government, our education has made considerable
strides in recent years. . . . The development of education
substantially contributes to the innovation of science and
technology, the development of economy, the social progress,
and the cultural florescence. (GSPDE, 2010, preamble)
The provincial governments are immodest about their success in
education no matter how much difficulty the province may have. The
policy documents from Chinese universities reveal the policymakers’
inclination to exaggerate their performance in their self-evaluation of
education.
China’s policies on education do not show real negative aspects. It
is difficult to find any valuable “negative” assessment in the documents
I have examined. For example, the Outline of Guangdong’s Provincial
Plan states their problems about international students as “it does not
completely meet our people’s request for education and developing
economy” (GDPDE, 2010). It means that their previous policies are not
perfect. However they have not clarified the situation in its education.
Similarly, Fujian province’s policy on education says: “Standing at a new
historical point of departure, we must see it clearly that the education does
not fit in with the needs of the development of social economy and does
not get with our people’s expectations of education” (FJPDE, 2011).
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All the policy documents I have reviewed present that the devel-
opment of education has great historical base and outstanding expected
results (YNPDE, 2011, preamble). However these policies do not mention
the possible risks and what kind of measures they may take to resolve
problems. Most of the documents do not show information about prior
policies’ weaknesses. Policies from the central government and provincial
governments never mentioned the shortcomings or defects of previous
policies. At the university level, some policies have demonstrated the
flaws in former policies, but those are not helpful on how to improve the
policies. Instead, the arrangement for weak aspects of prior polices is to
balance the document text, but there are no solutions to handle cases in
failure.
In general, policies on education are immersed in political interests.
The policymakers at variety of levels attempt to show their allegiance
to Beijing, and try to display their merits and achievements at the same
time. The policies here are not in the best interest of the public, but are




Calculated opening-up to international
students
International students in China are managed according to China’s political
necessity. China’s central government tries to influence young generation
of other countries (MOE, 2010a; Wang, 2014). The provincial govern-
ments and universities tend to improve their own positions in China’s
political system. China’s openness does not mean that the CCP govern-
ment accepts the mainstream ideology or institutions from international
communities. China maximized the CCP’s interests from its educational
policies instead of Chinese people’s interests.
8.1 Double standards in student management practice
China uses different methods to manage domestic students and inter-
national students. Basically, three respects can be recognized. First,
international students in China may gain much better service than Chinese
students (Tencent News, 2019). This phenomenon has been discussing
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on Chinese internet communities (Jianshu, 2019). Most of Chinese
universities or other educational institutes provide international students
with better facilities and amenities than they offer to Chinese students.
For example, universities install air-conditioners for international students
in their apartments but Chinese students do not have this privilege. It is
reported that “luxury” apartments are allocated to international students at
Peking University. Individual bathrooms, air-conditioning system, heating
system, gyms, rest rooms, TV sets, and decorations, etc., are included in
international students’ dormitories. Four Chinese graduates, by contrast,
must crowd in shabbier room less than 15 m2, without balcony and
separate bathroom which looks like the rooms in the movies of the 1990s
(Beijing Youth Daily, 2015). In material respect, obviously, international
students in China get preferential treatment which is called “super-national
treatment” (chaoguomin daiyu) by some Chinese media (L. Shen, 2019;
Zhao, 2019).
Second, direct political indoctrination has not been required compo-
nent of curriculum for international students. Unlike Chinese students,
international students in China do not need to take ideology courses.
Chinese students must attend classes such as “Mao Zedong Thought
and the Theoretical System of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”,
“Deng Xiaoping Theories”, “Three Represents”, “Scientific Outlook on
Development”, and “Xi Jinping Thoughts” (Lu, 2017), even PhD students
must take them as compulsory courses. Many Chinese students consider
these courses to be a kind of mind-numbing ideological propaganda,
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though the selection of “political thoughts” course is mandatory at all
universities (Zeng, 2016). Compared with Chinese students, international
students are supposed to learn the history and culture of China or other
subjects which may embody the CCP and Chinese nation’s “greatness”.
Third, international students do not need to strictly satisfy academic
requirements for admission and keeping their positions at Chinese univer-
sities. Due to the unbalanced distribution of education resources in China,
those universities located far away from “National Central Cities” (China
Daily, 2018) may not keep international students to stay. In other words,
international students tend to go to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and
other major cities in China to pursue their higher education. As a result,
those universities in small cities do not have equal opportunities to enroll
international students. In the circumstances, the universities in non-central
cities prefer to relax their entrance requirements in order that they can
maintain amount of international students (Tian, 2017). In actuality, even
top university like Tsinghua University (U.S. News & World Report, 2019)
has been questioned that it has relatively lower standard of enrollment
for international students than that for Chinese students (Sha, 2017). This
means the number of international students is the most important factor for
the international education at university.
Also, Chinese universities choose to lower the quality standards in
the evaluation of program so that many international students may achieve
their academic aim with ease (H. Zhang, 2019). A clear illustration is that
there are variety of promises about improving the quality of international
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education in five-year plans made by Chinese universities. For instance,
Chang’an University declares in its 12th plan: “ the university is going to
attract excellent international students, and improve the education quality”
(Chang’an University, 2011, p. 30). According to Study at Chongqing
University Plan, the university would build a better international education
system, improve the quality of education, recruit more excellent students,
and invest more capital in international education (Chongqing University,
2017, p. 20). These requirements in policies to some extent prove that
the quality of international education in China is poor. It seems that this
education quality is a problem need to resolve. But it is difficult to evaluate
this quality, no institutes are willing to invest in the quality.
In brief, China apply different methods to international students and
domestic students. International students enjoy overall better service,
regardless of hardware and software, than their Chinese classmates. It
suggests that the CCP authorities have been doing this on purpose.
8.2 International students’ limited freedom in China
Different from their Chinese classmates, the international students in
China indeed enjoy some basic freedoms, although there are some limi-
tations. Firstly, international students can have religious freedom in China.
A document from the MOE of China provides that:
Higher education institutions shall respect the national customs
and religious beliefs of international students, but are forbidden
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to provide places for religious rituals. Any missionary activities
and religious gathering are forbidden on campus. (MOE, 2017a,
article 29, chapter 4).
International students obviously do not relish full religious freedom
in China. They are allowed to perform rituals at churches, temples, or
mosques because these places are completely controlled and under su-
pervising by Chinese authorities. The police even strictly prohibits family
religious gathering let alone organize religious activities in dormitory.
In 2011, a group of international students at Zhen University as-
sembled in their dormitory to celebrate their religious festival. But the
university authority dispersed the students by threat of consequences.
As a rule, the outcome may include a warning notice (label), cancelling
scholarship, informing to the students’ embassies or other diplomatic
agencies in China. One of the extreme consequences is deportation.
Especially, the authorities pay a close attention to how international
students communicate with their Chinese classmates. In some cases, the
students cadres from Student Unions or other organization would report
international students’ activities to the authorities.
As for Chinese students, they theoretically should have this freedom
according to China’s constitution. However it has been taken away in
reality. Moreover, Chinese students who have expressed their faith are
always faced with considerable pressure from the authorities if they are not
from ethnic minorities.
Another freedom international students in China may enjoy is to
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use international internet service with virtual private network (VPN).
The Great Firewall (GFW) helps Chinese authority regulate the internet
domestically (D. Anderson, 2012; Roberts, 2018). A great number of
international internet services are blocked in China, including FaceBook,
Google, and Twitter etc., (Dowell, 2006; Stevenson, 2007). However,
international students usually had connection with friends or family
members in their home countries and they need to visit those internet
service blocked in China. Chinese authorities turns a blind eye when the
international students bypass internet censorship (Internet censorship
circumvention ). Contrary to international students’ privilege, Chinese
students would not be so “lucky”. They are confronted with risk of being
admonished, fined, detained, even imprisoned. There are striking cases that
Chinese netizens who used VPN to “break” the Great Firewall had been
sentenced (Griffiths, 2018; Haas, 2017).
In addition, international students in China may have freedom of
association. According to the No. 42 order from three Ministries (the
Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of
Public Security), international students may form their own organizations:
With permission from the higher education institutions, interna-
tional students may form their own on-campus organizations for
promoting friendship, which shall conduct activities within the
scopes defined by Chinese laws and regulations, and are subject
to the leadership and management of the higher education
institutions. (MOE, 2017a, article 27, 28)
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Although international students in China do enjoy some freedoms,
China has been further tightening its political controls. According to
the Ministry of Education’s No. 9 Order (issued in 2000), international
students may organize inter-school or inter-region organizations on
condition that they need to “apply to competent authorities of the Chinese
Government for approval” (MOE, 2000, article 32,chapter 6). But the
No. 42 Order (issued in 2017) removed the above content which means
the CCP authorities worry about international students’ association with
other people. It indicates that the CCP attempts to re-assert its influence
over academia. Plainly, international students would not be exempted from
these efforts (Horwitz, 2017).
It is understandable that China requires all international students
to obey Chinese laws, by-laws and regulations. However the authorities
impose strong restrictions on freedoms of religion, movement, internet,
speech, assembly and association. Despite the loss of some rights and
freedoms, international students are in a better position than their Chinese
classmates.
8.3 China’s expectations for international education
At the central government level, China aims to make international students
understand, befriend, love, and espouse China (zhihua, youhua, aihua,
qinhua). It accordingly hopes international students to back to their home
countries after graduation. In addition, China expects these students to
become powerful people in their own countries in order that they may
72
develop friendly relationships with China in the future.
In contrast to typical immigration countries, China does not want to
turn its international students to citizens or permanent residents. With 1.4
billion people, China is the most populous nation in the world. Its limited
resources can not support too many people. A fact is that China can not
provide enough jobs for Chinese people, although some of its sectors
are faced with serious shortage of labor force. China needs a great deal
of low-end work force and high-end human resource. To be very much
in evidence, international students in China are neither “low-end” nor
“high-end”. Chinese authorities believe that only top universities such as
Berkeley, Cambridge, Harvard, Oxford, and Stanford can produce talents
they need. That is why China launched the Thousand Talents Plan (TTP)
or Thousand Talents Program to enroll scientists and professors from
western countries (Barry & Kolata, 2020; Leonard, 2019).
Also, China does not have a shortage of labor force with higher
degrees. In past years, many Chinese university students were in an
embarrassing situation that no sooner had they obtained their degrees than
they became unemployed (The Economist, 2019). There were more than
8.3 million graduates competing in the labor market in 2019 (Bloomberg
News, 2019). Documents show that Chinese authorities should help
international students get into China’s labor market:
Where a foreigner holding a residence permit for study intends
to engage in off-campus work-study or internship, he or she
shall, upon the approval of the school, apply to the exit and entry
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administration authority of the public security organ to have
such information as the location and duration of the work-study
program or internship placement specified in his or her residence
permit.
A foreigner holding a residence permit for study shall not
engage in any off-campus work-study or internship unless the
information prescribed in the preceding paragraph is specified in
his or her residence permit. (The State Council, 2013, article 22,
chapter 3).
However, another regulation does not allow international students to
work after they finish their programs in China:
Foreign students are not allowed to take up jobs, operate busi-
ness, or engage in other business-related activities during their
study in China. However, work-study activities in accordance
with college rules are permitted. (MOE, 2017a, article 30,
chapter 4)
In fact, Chinese governments did little to help international students
work in China in past years. Also, China seldom issues work visa to
international students, although it officially has changed its visa policy to
attract excellent international students to stay (F. Li & Wang, 2017). China
clearly does not think highly of international students and does not hope
them to stay in China after they graduate.
What China really wants is that some of the international students
go back to their home countries and become “power elites” (Mills &
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Wolfe, 2000). China’s international student policy is apparently aimed at
nurturing “friends” who understand China, befriend China, love China,
and espouse China (Chinese pinyin: zhihua, youhua, aihua, qinhua)
(Byram & Stoicheva, 2019; Press Office of MOE, 2014). As one of the
most important policies on international students, “Study in China Plan”
made by the Ministry of Education clearly indicates that “(The Plan’s)
goal is to train a large group of international students who understand
and befriend China” (MOE, 2010a, article 1). In actuality, “understand,
befriend, love, and espouse China” is well known to China’s diplomats and
intellectuals.
In other words, China needs these international students to go back
to their homelands to gain power so that China may establish better
relationships and control these potential leaders and their countries. To do
so, even China’s state-owned enterprises have participated the strategy and
supported “ fostering foreigners and making them understand, befriend,
love, and espouse China” (BIT, 2017; GEOHARBOUR, 2018).
In general, China has been investing in international relations in
future. Naturally, China does not count on these international students to
be brought up as real “Talents” and work in China. China is just using the
international students and try to establish a kind of relationships (guanxi)
to their home countries. Further, China harbors an ambition to control or
rule these countries in the future. Thus some Chinese diplomats boasted
that a former president of an African country was “our man”, because the
CCP supported him since he was very young.
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At the levels of provincial government and university, the most
important part of the international education policy is the “number” of
international students because it may substantially help the policymakers
scramble for political achievements. Therefore most documents of inter-
national student policy I have examined indicated that they (provinces or
universities) would greatly increase the amount of international students.
For example, Beijing Foreign Studies University planned to enroll 1000
international students by the end of 2015 in its 12th five-year plan (BFSU,
2013, p. 7). Another university’s policy showed that it would increase its
international students up to 3000 in the year 2015 (NJU, 2011, p. 30). In
fact, it is difficult to work out how they calculated this number. Majority of
Chinese universities have numbers of international students in their plan.
Correspondingly, practical measures are taken to enroll students.
The provinces and universities try to increase their intake of international
students by provision of scholarships (HNPDE, 2018; SPDE, 2016).
Those comparatively developed provinces or municipalities such as
Guangdong province and Shanghai municipality have greater ability to
attract international students, while poorer provinces in the west part of
China proved to be more difficult to implement their plans.
Different from the central government, provincial governments and
universities in China have little interesting to educate and turn international
students into China’s friends. Therefore provinces or universities seldom
set their aim for international education as “fostering international students
who understand, befriend, love, and espouse China”. On the contrary,
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they tend to attain higher rank by increasing the intake of international
students. Some provinces changed the slogan above into “ understand,
befriend, love, and espouse (certain province)”. A report shows Shandong
province’s slogan is: trying to enroll more international students who can
understand, love, and publicize Shandong province (SDPDE, 2018, p. 10).
Provincial governments plainly do not consider international education
seriously except the number of students which can be easily shown to their
superiors.
Chinese universities set their goals for policies on international
students also relate to politics. All the documents from Ministry of
Education are parts of certain national five-year plan. The universities
affiliated to the central government (MOE) correspondingly have their
own five-year plans. Most of these documents have shown ambitious
goals. Comparing its 12th plan with the 13th plan, I found that Xiamen
University did not accomplish its aim. For example, the university had
1200 international students in 2005, and in the year 2010 it had 2500
international students (ODP, 2011, p. 1). The university set a goal that
1500–2000 international students would pursue degrees in 2015 (including
visiting students) (ODP, 2011, p. 7). While this university established
higher aim in its 13th plan (ODP, 2016, p. 13). Evidently, the university
had not achieved its aim. These universities rarely think seriously whether
they can reach their goals or not. Like the nation’s GDP, “Growth”
becomes a significant policy objective. This policy just shows a stance or
their attitudes.
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In short, China’s administration of international students adheres
to a rule of “distinguishing inside and outside” (neiwai youbie). That is
to say, China enforces double standards to treat domestic students and
international students. International students enjoy more material comforts
and political freedoms. However, the CCP has exerted growing influence
over international students since Mr. Xi Jinping rose to power. China
prefers sending these international students home rather than letting
them stay in order that they may become the leaderships of their home
counties. As for Chinese universities and provincial governments, political
achievement is the primary consideration. With the result that China’s
opening its education up to the world serves the CCP’s ambition of global
strategy. This is also China’s philosophy of globalization. Capitalism has
been trying to change China into a democratic country by market-based
economy, but currently, the world situation shows that China has its own
methods to change the world. One may question the CCP’s pursuit is
China’s national interests. Chinese people, however, are not beneficiaries.
78
Chapter 9
The state as a tool to serve the ruling
class
The findings described above have shown that China’s policy on interna-
tional students, as a part of the state institution, is not in the best interests
of the public. Also, the CCP cadres’ view is determinative in the policy
framing, while the public have little chance to influence the process.
Furthermore, opening up to the world or globalization in China’s context
is only a tool to serve the CCP’s purpose. The findings indicate that the
public’s interests are not seriously considered in China’s international
student policies. In other words, the policymakers or participants do not
work for Chinese people. The policymakers (the CCP cadres) in China
are accountable to their superiors and finally, they serve the ruling class
in stead of Chinese people.
79
9.1 The regime taking no accountability to people
Chinese people’s interests are not respected in the policymaking. The
CCP cadres create policies in order to achieve their own political aims.
Winning in the competition with other cadres or countries is their pursuit.
To do this, the totalitarian regime uses taxpayers’ money at will. That is
why one can not find their detailed budget in their plans. In some cases
I can read several vague numbers about the budget of their plans, but no
valuable information to follow up. Shandong province’s investment of
CNY¥8,000,000 per year (about CAD$2,000,000) in international students
is a typical example (SDPDE, 2018, p. 2). Generally, the CCP cadres are
not accountable to the public.
Public policy is usually designed for achieving desired goal which
should be in the public interest. However, I have not found firm evidence
to show that China needs huge amount of international students in the
short term. That is to say, the policy does not aim at maximizing the
public’s interest. Why does China make this kind of policy? A reasonable
explanation is that the cadres need this policy and utilize it as an instru-
ment. If the public’s interest is not the aim of the policy, the ruling class
should be the beneficiary.
The reality in China is that the CCP controls the most power and key
resources. Under the circumstances, the CCP has power to frame policy
without much limitation. This means the CCP may make policies accord-
ing to their own needs, even if certain policy is not in the best interest
of Chinese poeple. It is not difficult to read words in the documents like
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“important to help our nation”, “significant to change China’s status in
the world”, and “important to break through the blockades from western
world” (MOE, 2010a; The State Council, 2010). It is doubtful that Chinese
people really understand why those claims are important. In addition, it
is highly debatable that the public are able to participate the process of
policymaking. The CCP cadres allege that they themselves represent the
people, while those members sitting in the rubber-stamp—the National
People’s Congress (NPC)—are CCP cadres or tycoons who have benefited
from the regime (O‘Brien, 1988; O‘brien, 2008). People’s voice is not easy
to be heard via CCP’s organizations and people’s interests are not best
served by pursuing the ruling class’ gains.
Probably, one may consider that we have misunderstood the CCP
and it may serve Chinese people from the depths of heart as they claims.
However we can not ignore the fact that Chinese people are not benefi-
ciaries of these educational policies because it is they who finally pay the
money. For example, the Confucius Institute (CI) program administered
by the Ministry of Education through the Hanban is one of them. Though
it could have been a type of cultural exchange organizations, the CI
program is used for ideological propaganda (Paradise, 2009). Also, in
many cases, the CIs are wasting Chinese taxpayers’ money. Most the CIs
have US$100,000–$200,000 budget per year (Hartig, 2015, p. 106), but
many directors of the CIs may use this money by their own arrangement
without serious supervision and audit. These programs have nothing to do
with Chinese people.
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Only a totalitarian regime like China may spend people’s money
freely without punishment (Hildebrandt, 2013). Considering the tremen-
dous amount of money China spends on the international students and
the poor service Chinese governments offer to domestic students (Liao &
He, 2018), we have reason to believe that China’s policy on international
students is also utilized by the ruling class to realize their own interests.
In the light of the CCP’s manipulation of power in China, political
prospect is the primary calculation for the CCP cadres. The cadres in
this system are in highly competitive situations. Due to the CCP’s top-
down management system (S. Li, 2016), many cadres are clever political
climbers. The CCP cadres believe the proverb that “Those soldiers who
are not willing to be a general are not good soldiers”. Thus they use
all possible methods to get promotion (Kou & Tsai, 2014). Only if a
cadre is in a higher position may he have more power and control more
key sources. For these cadres in CCP’s system, being the winners in
competition among rivals is an effective way to protect themselves and
their subordinates or followers (Kennedy & Chen, 2018; Mertha, 2017).
Logically, as a functional part of the CCP regime, the educational cadres or
other local cadres do not really respect the people.
Undoubtedly, this does not only happen in China. Besides North
Korea, Iran, and several other countries, many quasi-democratic countries
have been practicing a certain kind of authoritarianism. However, the
existence of opposition parties and freedom of press has shaped far better
social and political environment in most democratic nations, while China
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is going farther and farther on the opposite track.
9.2 Responsible to cadres of higher rank
The leading cadres of all levels can decide who could get promoted in
China’s bureaucratic system (Edin, 2003). Given that Chinese people
in actuality can not vote to elect officials, a practical way for the lower
cadres is to please their superiors or higher-ranking cadres to get promoted
(S. Li, 2016). China has a pyramid-like power structure (Marinaccio,
2016) in which all the cadres in relatively lower positions may need to
please their own superiors to get promotion. Therefore in this system,
successful cadres usually are crafty sycophants except the appointment of
nepotism. Also, the cadre who wants personal advancement needs to show
some political achievements (zhengji) when they are at their posts (Gao,
2017). Thus the cadres in lower tiers do their best to satisfy the elusive
requirements from higher governmental authority or higher officials,
taking no consideration of Chinese people’s demands.
Undeniably, some policies have beneficial effects on the people,
and the cadres in charge may get approval from their superiors as well
(Whiting, 2004, pp. 109–110). But the policies they made are not neces-
sarily of service to the people. In many circumstances, the CCP cadres and
governments’ interests may be in conflicts with the people. Nevertheless
the cadres tend to obey the order from their superiors in stead of the
people. The resistance from Chinese people to some policies must be
cracked down without doubt. Mostly, as members of the CCP, the cadres’
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interests are based on their power invested with by their superiors. Seeing
that Chinese people do not have an effective way to constrain them, the
cadres accordingly use the government and other state apparatus as tool
to serve their own interests without restrictions (Miliband, 1969; Quinney,
1980).
The policy succeeds when its political aim achieves. If the central
government in Beijing requires that certain work should be done in 5 or
10 years, and then this work must be finished within that time limit. For
example, after the CCP general secretaries declared that China would build
a “moderately prosperous society” in 2020 (J. Hu, 2007; Xi, 2017), all
Chinese provinces, even universities must follow. However action does
not always mean success. Obviously, this “secure a decisive victory in
building a moderately prosperous society in all respects” (Xi, 2017) will
not become a reality in 2020. No province, clearly, will accomplish this
task. Even though, the CCP cadres would not take responsibility for this
kind of policy. Likewise, policies on international education are only
words and numbers in the document. Comparing China’s 12th five-year
plan with the 13th, one can find that policymakers do not seriously deal
with the policies except political consideration. Also, the policymakers
would not accept blame, even certain policy has proven unsuccessful.
Plainly, the number has no relation to the Chinese people, but just a
reflection of politics.
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9.3 Policy used as a political instrument
As constituent parts of the state (Anter, 2014; Jessop, 1990; Pierson,
2004), governments and other institutes are used as political tools by the
ruling class. In the circumstance, education policy works as a political
instrument as well. Through international education, the central govern-
ment in Beijing aims for its impact at the level of globe, while Chinese
provincial governments and other educational institutions try to pursue
political prospect. Consequently, the CCP policymakers’ political pursuit
is the main motivation behind China’s policy on international students.
The central government does not represent Chinese people in the
policymaking. The State Council and its Ministry of Education make
national policy cater to the CCP leader’s will. The policy from the central
government has connection to the top leader’s political achievements
(zhengji), just as Mr. Xi Jinping’s “China dream” and “One Belt, One
Road” initiative (Berlie, 2020; Ferdinand, 2016; Swaine, 2015). The CCP
leaders want a “stronger” state while the minister serves this purpose. The
policy on international students is part of the leaders’ political strategy and
has little consideration of people’s interests.
Unlike democratic states, China’s provincial and local governments
mainly obey the orders from Beijing instead of Chinese people. Therefore
the provincial governments in China must pay more attention to the
political correctness, and no local cadres are willing to take a risk of
making political mistakes. Chinese Provincial governments follow the
policies or other guidelines from the central government. Moreover, the
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CCP cadres have little chance of promotion in jobs without their superiors’
endorsement. For this reason, the most important work for the local cadres
is to fawn on superiors. With regard to the public or people, it is not the
CCP cadres’ prime consideration.
Similar to provincial governments, Chinese universities make policies
for their own need. The universities in China are very different from
those in western countries. Chinese universities are direct under control
of the CCP. Universities’ power structure is a copy of government. Each
university in China has a party committee secretary (dangwei shuji)
who is the real decision maker at certain university (Jiang & Li, 2012).
Furthermore, the president of a university is usually a deputy party
committee secretary. For this reason the policies made in the university
system are apt to be more political. The party committee secretaries
at universities follow the same tract of promotion with other cadres in
governmental system (Jiang & Li, 2016). Therefore certain policy and its
possible results are parts of the party committee secretaries’ achievements.
The interest of the public, or the people, is the last thing that the CCP
cadres consider.
For the CCP policymakers, securing political interests outweighs
all other considerations. Due to the absence of opposite parties, no
independent organizations act as watchdog over governments or cadres
except their own departments, the Commission for Discipline Inspection
(jiwei) (X. Guo, 2014) and the CCP Supervisory Commission (jianchawei)
(Gong, 2008) for instance. Hence the CCP cadres are players and referees
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at the same time. Even if the pubic question what the cadres have done,
the CCP holds the power of final adjudication. Furthermore, the Publicity
Departments at all levels, including university, control all the media.
In this kind of climate, policies certainly have no concern with people.
Accordingly the cadres of the CCP at different levels pay little attention





This chapter will reiterate the main arguments of this thesis at first, and
then summarize the study. From there, a reflection on the research will be
shown. Lastly, recommendations and contributions will be discussed in
brief.
10.1 The motivation behind the policy
By documentary analysis, this research has answered the question I
addressed. First, it has explained why the intention of China’s policy on
international students seems difficult to understand. Second, it revealed
that the motivation is to use the policy as a tool to maximize the ruling
class’ interests.
China’s policy on international students is aimed at enhancing its
political influence on other countries by training their younger generation
of potential leaderships. As the ruling class in the Party-State (dangguo)
(Suzuki, 2016), the CCP controls the most key resources in China, includ-
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ing the state apparatus. The CCP members take most important positions
in the organizations of this country. To large extent, the party is the state
and vice versa. The CCP cadres in the central government work for the
legitimacy of the regime and their personal interests. By international
education, China may gain a group of foreign friends who understand,
befriend, love, and espouse China. These potential power elites may
help the CCP increase its impact on international affairs and this also can
consolidate the CCP’s power in China.
The central government tries to tell Chinese people that the CCP
regime is the best. The effort to make China great is one of the methods.
The policies from the central government in Beijing fairly bristle with
ambition to become a superpower. This is why China has special education
policies to support students from so-called “One Belt, One Road” coun-
tries (MOE, 2016). Moreover, the cadres in the central government use the
state to pursue their family and bloc interest. By way of cooperation with
their international partners, many state-owned enterprises (Putterman &
Dong, 2000; Sheng & Zhao, 2013) operated by higher cadres’ families or
people from the same bloc benefit from these international cooperation.
Although the policies on international students from Chinese provin-
cial governments and universities reflect that the policymakers try to
maximize their own interests and do not target the China’s international
strategy, these participants in reality are of service to the central gov-
ernment by enrolling more international students. Through increasing
international students, the provincial and other institutional participants
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attempt to meet the requirements from the central government therefore
improve their political prospect. In other words, the central government
and other participants have different calculation, but their joint efforts
yield a same result—the increasing of international students. From this
perspective, the provincial and other institutional policies are based upon
policymakers interests, and in the meantime, they consist the national aim
and policy.
China’s policy on international students fails to consider Chinese
people’s interests. However these policies are at the expense of the people.
The policymakers evidently do not represent the people, and nevertheless
they are just in the name of people to secure the advantage of China’s
ruling class—the CCP and its supporters.
10.2 Summary
With the most populous and the second largest economy in the world,
China does not seem to need a great number of international students in
the short term. However China has made a series of plan to enroll more
international students. The reasons for China’s acts are interesting and
deserving of study. According to instrumentalist and organizational realist
approaches, the state functions ultimately to serve capitalist interests. Al-
though China calls itself a “socialist” country, it follows a state-capitalism
or “crony capitalism” approach with special “party-state” system which
has basic features of capitalist countries.
Drawing on analysis of policy documents, the research shows that
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China’s organizations tend to pour their resources into fields from which
the policymakers themselves may benefit, but take little consideration into
the interest of ordinary people or society. The policymakers create policies
without real consideration of the public and the process of policymaking
is lack of transparency. Under the CCP’s control, the public do not have
chance to participate the policymaking.
Several factors have played key roles in the policymaking decisions
on international students. First, the leaderships at all levels of institute in
China dominate most crucial processes of policymaking. Second, political
prospects are primary consideration for cadres in variety of institutes, and
cadres are not willing to take any political risks to make policies.
International students in China are managed according to China’s
political necessity. China’s central government tries to train young gener-
ation of potential leaders for other countries. The provincial governments
and universities tend to improve their own positions in China’s political
system. China’s open does not mean that the CCP government accepts
the mainstream ideology or institutions from international communities.
China maximized the CCP’s interests from its educational policies instead
of Chinese people’s interests.
The findings have shown that China’s policy on international students,
as a part of the state institution, is not in the best interest of the public.
Also, the CCP cadres’ view is determinative in the policy framing, while
the public have little chance to influence the process. Furthermore,
opening up to the world or globalization in China’s context is only a tool
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serving the CCP’s purpose. The findings indicate that the public’s interest
is not seriously considered in China’s international student policies. In
other words, the policymakers or the participants in the policymaking do
not work for the interests of Chinese people. They are accountable to their
superiors and finally, they serve the ruling class instead of Chinese people.
10.3 Reflection on the research
This research has several limitations. First, limitations of access to inside
documents might have negative influence on this research. Policy docu-
ments published by Chinese governments may not reflect policymakers’
real attitudes or intention, so an ideal method to solve this problem is
to obtain their inside documents, including their daily work logs, year
plans, working emails and so on. But this work is too arduous to carry
out considering the minimal degree of openness and transparency in the
governments’ policymaking in China (Horsley, 2007; Piotrowski, Zhang,
Lin, & Yu, 2009). Of course, researchers can still conduct research by
indirect approach (Abrams, 2006; Feldman, 2005).
Second, the availability of alternative data is also a limitation on
the quality of this research. It is difficult to interview the policymakers
or participants who have taken part in the policy process. Some of them
rejected my interview request due to concern about safety. In some cases,
the interviewees would describe briefly what happened in the process of
policymaking after their self-censorship. Obviously, this description may
not be useful for the research (D. L. Shambaugh, 2017).
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An important assumption have been made in this research is that
the fairly low level of participation by the public in China in the process
makes the policymaking on international student enrollment undemocratic.
Although there are probably some professionals who took part in the
policymaking (Ma & Lin, 2012; B. G. Peters & Zhao, 2017; Wang &
Zhang, 2018), they are not representatives of the public in China. These
professional people are not elected by the public, but selected by the
CCP authorities. In view of this, the research considers that the policy
on international students does not have enough support from the people.
Even in democratic countries the public may not participate the education
policymaking, they at least have the right to take part in it.
China is defined as a totalitarian state in this research, notwith-
standing there are other definitions of this regime (Hildebrandt, 2013;
J. C. Weiss, 2013). As the only real political party, however, the CCP
controls absolute power and key resources and does not allow any op-
position parties. The political realities in China manifestly accords with
the intension of totalitarianism. What is more, “China” is regarded as a
single unitary actor in this research. In other words, all the institutional
participants, provincial governments, and universities are parts of the state
in policymaking and they carry out the “order” and follow the guidelines
on educational policy from the central government, though their pursuit of
power may differ from higher cadres in the central governments.
This study is mainly based on policy documents from China issued
after 2000. It does not mean there are essential difference between the
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policies before the year of 2000 and after 2000. The strategy was designed
to make the research a feasible plan. In this regard, three factors are
taken into consideration. Above all, China has been in a different policy
environment in the post-Cold War era. China claims it to be the largest
socialist country and would take the place left by the former Soviet
Union (Ong, 2013). The change of China’s position in the world has been
reshaping its policymaking. Moreover, the widespread use of internet in
China after 2000 (F. Shen et al., 2009) has made it easier to retrieve policy
documents, and this makes it possible for more researchers to conduct
research on this topic without traditional fieldwork. Lastly, it is only in last
20 years that international students have been flocking to China.
10.4 The contributions of the research
This exploration may extend to existing knowledge in the area of China
and Policy Analysis. Aside from its additions to policy analysis, several
contributions of this research to knowledge are to be expected.
At first, it is likely to provide us with an alternative explanation for
the growth of international students in China. Unlike other studies that
emphasize the “pull” factor of China’s economy growth, this research
tends to accentuate the role of China’s policy on international students.
Typically, international students contribute to the economy growth, the
social and cultural diversification, and the growth of population. However,
China does not seem to need these contributions. This study may answer
the question why China is eager to enroll international students without
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consideration of the public’s interest.
In addition, we may gain a different perspective on China’s moti-
vation for its education policy and the process of policymaking. In most
cases, policies are designed to achieve desired goals in the best interest
of the public. However, some of China’s policies are designed to help the
ruling class to consolidate their own power and positions but not for the
public.
Moreover, this study shows China’s general attitude toward global-
ization is “using”. China’s opening its education up to the world serves
the CCP’s ambition of global strategy. This is also China’s philosophy
of globalization. The discovery would help us understand how the CCP
attends and changes international institutions.
Lastly, this study could help us know more about the logic of power
operating in China. China is one of the several countries which lack
transparency in modern world. Outsiders are not easy to fathom out how
the cadre bureaucracy make various decisions. Due to its authoritarianism
with a closed system, China has always confused the outside world,
and this makes it impossible to fully understand how the state operates.
Though it claims itself to be a peace-loving and socialist country with
Chinese characteristics, China has been arousing concerns from all over
the world because of the aggressive posture it adopts. By answering the
questions, we may know more about China’s acts.
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10.5 Relevant recommendations
Based on above research findings and conclusion, several more studies
may be conducted in the future to understand the CCP’s policy and its
regime. The possible topics may be explored as follows:
(1) How the CCP uses globalization and international institutions to
consolidate its regime. This study may help us to explain China’s acts
in the international community.
(2) How globalization (migration) discourse influences domestic politics
of China. Undoubtedly, China utilizes globalization as a tool to pursue
their own interests. However, international institutions also have
impact on the ways of thinking. It would be interesting to explore how
much the CCP cadres would like to accept universal value.
(3) How China’s local cadres choose their polices to maximize their inter-
ests. Certain policy may have more probability to lead the CCP cadres
to higher posts. What are these policies and how the policymakers
make their decision would be interesting topics.
(4) How domestic institutes use globalization or internalization as a tool
to pursue their own interests. Chinese universities are interested in
making themselves “internationalized”. What they can benefit from
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